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Thanks. --DouglasReay
[PaulCrowley] wrote:
- The house publishes a list of parties (including itself)
- All parties privately choose a random seed
- All parties reveal a hash of their seed
- All parties except the house reveal their seeds
- The house hashes all seeds including its own in the order of the list published
- DouglasReay wrote: I'd prefer if people didn't have a completely free choice of random seed, to help prevent them using the birthday-party effect to pre-generate collisions
- [MoonShadow] wrote: Split step 4 up: make all revealing parties reveal their seeds one bit at a time (so everyone's bit 0 are known before any bit 1 are revealed, etc.) This forces you to commit to one of your many precalculated birthday seeds that all hash to the same thing before you know enough of anyone else's to be able to decide which one benefits you most. Hm. The house can still usefully precalculate hash collisions. Maybe use something more resistant to collisions than a crypto hash in order to commit to your seed? What is there? Sign your seed along with a load of salt and publish the signature? Paul, you suggested 160-bit seeds above to resist birthday attacks; how computationally hard is it to find two 160-bit strings that have the same MD5 hash?
- DouglasReay wrote: revealing the seeds one bit at a time sounds nice, but I'm not sure it could be done efficiently enough in practice over the internet between multiple players. It would certainly make tunneling over email problematic.
(your new thread here)
CategoryCryptography